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Opportunistic land encroachment, resulting from costly and incomplete 
enforcement of common land boundaries, is a problem in many less-developed 
countries. A multi-period model of such encroachment is presented in this paper. The 
model accounts explicitly for the cumulative effects of non-compliance of regulations 
designed to protect a finite, non-renewable resource ￿ in this case common land ￿ from 
private expropriation. Gradual evolution of property rights from common to private ￿ 
the consequence of encroachment ￿ is demonstrated to be an equilibrium.  To prevent 
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￿The raised platforms outside [the houses] had been extended over the years 
and now took up most of the alley.  They epitomized the philosophy of 
encroachment ￿ when you find empty land on your borders, grab a few feet of 





Encroachment, the illegal occupation and cultivation of common land, occurs 
throughout many less-developed countries.  Much of this encroachment has been at the 
boundaries of common and private land: Farmers with private land adjacent to the 
common land encroach by gradually moving the boundary marker, incorporating the 
common land into their own holdings, and farming it as their own to the exclusion of 
others.  The authorities, and even other villagers, do attempt to stop such encroachment 
through a variety of costly enforcement techniques, yet some encroachment inevitably 
goes undetected or unpunished.  Often this encroachment is followed years later by the 
ex post granting of permanent and transferable property rights to the encroacher, a 
process known in India as ￿regularization,￿ the formalization of rights through adverse 
possession (Miceli and Sirmans, 1995). 
Evidently, de jure property rights over land, not to mention de facto property 
rights, are not absolute and static but evolve over time, even though much of the 
property rights literature suggests a fixed allocation of rights in equilibrium.
2 The 
evolutionary theory of property rights does suggest that land rights will gradually move 
towards formal private property regimes in response to population growth and market 
integration (see Feder and Feeny, 1991; Platteau, 1996, for a full discussion).  Yet 
                                                 
1   Raag Darbari: A Novel, by Shrilal Shukla (1992, p. 25); translated from the Hindi by Gillian 
Wright, Penguin Books. Robinson   Page  3 
explanatory factors such as population growth are exogenous.  Moreover, although no 
doubt some individuals are driven to encroach by poverty and lack of land, the little 
data that exist concerning encroachment do not support the claim that it is 
predominantly the poor who encroach (Jodha, 1986; Nadkarni and Pasha, 1991).  
Yet despite evidence that encroachment has been a key mechanism for the 
conversion of land from common to private hands, little formal recognition or analysis 
has been undertaken. This paper, building on the law enforcement literature, develops 
an optimal enforcement model that demonstrates that even when well defined, property 
rights may well evolve over time because it is costly to protect the boundaries of 
discrete areas of common land from opportunistic boundary encroachment. That is, the 
equilibrium itself may be an evolving path of changing land use. The model, pertinent 
to the patterns of boundary encroachment observed in Karnataka, is then used to 
explore the equilibrium path of changes in land use and de facto land ownership under 
different assumptions and conditions.  
The empirical motivation for this paper comes from Karnataka, a southern 
Indian state, where encroachment has been extensive. Official data hint at the large 
scale of this encroachment. For example, in 1990, the state government announced an 
amendment to the Karnataka Land Revenue Act of 1964 to allow regularization of 
725,000 acres of encroached land, equal to 5.5% of the state￿s remaining de jure 
common land (Karanth, 1992). In 1991, under the provision under section 94A of the 
same act, over one million applications were made for the regularization of over 2.5 
million acres of encroached land, approximately 20% of the state￿s de jure common 
                                                                                                                                             
2   A notable exception is Razzaz (1994, p. 13) who writes that non-compliance of laws 
governing property rights over common land can lead authorities to ￿reconsider their laws, 
their sanctions, and their methods of enforcement.￿ Robinson   Page  4 
land (personal communication with a state official; see Robinson, 1997).
3 More 
generally, estimates suggest that in dryland India, encroachment has been responsible 
for a 20 to 35 percent reduction in the area of common land over the past five decades 
(Jodha, 1986; Nadkarni and Pasha, 1991; SPWD, 1992). In Karnataka and other states, 
this encroachment and the subsequent changes in de facto land ownership have 
occurred despite official property rights, both private and common, being well defined 
at any given point in time over the past half-century, thereby making southern India a 
particularly interesting place to study the phenomenon of encroachment from an 
optimal enforcement perspective.
4 Several studies point to opportunistic boundary 
encroachment, undertaken by those who have access to common land by virtue of an 
adjacent boundary, as being a key component (SPWD, 1992; Robinson 1997).
5  
The theoretical underpinnings of this paper are found in the law enforcement 
and property rights literatures in which a general proposition, that typically it is not 
optimal to prevent all non-compliance with laws and regulations when enforcement is 
costly, is put forward (including Stigler, 1970; Eckert, 1979; Clark, 1982; Sutinen and 
Andersen, 1985; Milliman, 1986; Malik, 1990; Shavell, 1991; Sutinen, 1993; 
Mookherjee and Png, 1994).
6  Studies of fisheries, game poaching, or timber extraction 
from forests, typically recommend a steady-state static equilibrium comprising a 
                                                 
3   Although not all the applications for regularization will be granted, the author was told that 
given the length of time the land had been occupied, it was unlikely that anyone would be 
evicted. 
4   Well-defined de jure property rights in Karnataka are in contrast to many other less-
developed countries. For example, in Thailand, the great number of different legal land 
documents, combined with title deeds covering only 15 per cent of private land, attest to the 
uncertainty and controversy over property rights (Onchan, 1990).  
5   Boundary encroachment is more common in dryland areas, ￿stand alone￿ encroachments are 
mostly found in forested areas (Robinson, 1997). 
6   Typically either marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits of full enforcement, or 
criminals are discouraged from committing worse crimes through a reduction in the penalty 
for lesser crimes, and so some illegal acts occur unpunished.  This argument, regarding Robinson   Page  5 
positive level of both illegal catch and enforcement (for example, Sutinen and 
Andersen, 1985, and Milliman, 1986, Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1964; Helsley and 
Strange, 1994).
7 The stock remains constant, above the open-access level but below the 
socially optimal level.   
The loss of common land through encroachment is fundamentally different.  
Theft of fish or timber is from the flow of a renewable resource and so, in general, no 
long-run multi-period stock effects need be accounted for. Yet if the ￿theft￿ is of a 
finite, non-renewable resource such as land, no static equilibrium comprising positive 
and constant levels of both theft and enforcement effort each period can exist.  If any 
encroachment, however small, goes undetected and unpunished each period, the 
allocation of de facto ownership changes as the stock of common land decreases.  
Ultimately, under many scenarios, the static equilibrium is reached where none of the 
resource remains in its original state.
8  That is, gradual encroachment until no common 
land remains may be an efficient, if troubling, equilibrium. 
Although multi-period enforcement problems have been addressed in the law 
enforcement literature, the focus has been on the multi-period consequences for the 
criminal, not the enforcer (for example Leung, 1991, 1995; Nash, 1991; and Polinsky 
and Shavell, 1996).  The emphasis of the literature is appropriate because for many 
illegal acts that are discussed any cumulative effects that might occur are minor.  For 
example, if people double park in a street, whether or not they are caught they will most 
                                                                                                                                             
marginal deterrence, assumes that penalties are capped, typically at the current wealth of the 
criminal (for example: Shavell, 1991; Mookherjee and Png, 1994). 
7   Alternative mechanisms for controlling excessive depletion of a resource have been 
identified.  For example, Homans and Wilen (1997) discuss the use of regulatory 
instruments such as season-length restrictions to prevent over-fishing. 
8   When land encroachment occurs, the resource is not consumed or destroyed but rather is 
converted, possibly irreversibly, from one state ￿ common land such as forest or grazing ￿ to 
another ￿ cultivated land. Robinson   Page  6 
likely remove their cars at the end of the day. Yet for many environmental problems it 
is the cumulative effects on the resource that matter, such as the cumulative build up of 
pollution. 
This paper incorporates into its model an additional dimension of multi-period 
enforcement, the possible use of ￿stock￿ enforcement ￿ such as fences and ditches ￿ as 
an alternative to ￿flow￿ enforcement ￿patrols and punishments. Stock enforcement is 
defined as one for which enforcement expenditure is incurred in one period, but the 
benefits are persistent, carrying over into future periods. Such stock enforcements have 
been used by the forest department in Karnataka, especially in areas where the forest is 
highly valuable or at particular risk. A high fixed cost is imposed on the encroacher, but 
the marginal decision of how far to encroach is not affected. In contrast, the costs and 
benefits of flow enforcement, almost exclusively assumed in the law enforcement 
literature, concern a single period, affect the marginal decision over how far to 
encroach in that particular period, and do not exhibit persistence. 
The model demonstrates several key points. Firstly, under a broad range of 
parameters, the complete loss of discrete areas of common land should be expected, 
because protecting common land from encroachment is costly and hence rarely 
complete. Either the cost of the stock enforcement, although it could prevent all 
encroachment, is excessive relative to the benefits. Or even though the use of stock 
enforcement is optimal in terms of maximizing social welfare, the government agency 
responsible for the land does not have access to the upfront funds required, and so must 
rely on the second best solution of period-by-period flow enforcement comprising 
patrols and fines.  Robinson   Page  7 
The conclusion that it may be efficient to permit gradually all the land to be 
encroached is particularly problematic for policy makers in less-developed countries. 
Boundary encroachment typically results in an ad hoc, inefficient, and often inequitable 
allocation of land.  Positive externalities typically are lost. And only a specific group of 
villagers, those with land adjacent to the common land, has the opportunity to encroach 
in this way. Yet it is the poor and especially the landless poor who are particularly 
dependent on the shrinking commons but typically are themselves unable to encroach. 
Moreover, the path itself is important, because the transition of property rights is slow, 
often taking many decades. In countries where property rights regimes are still 
evolving, or where innovations to reduce the costs of enforcement are anticipated, 
reducing the current rate of encroachment could slow down the irreversible loss of 
common land until full protection is feasible.  
In this paper, both the approach to solving the model and the equilibrium path 
of encroachment and enforcement depend critically on the ￿enforcement technology.￿ 
The model that is solved allows for both stock and flow enforcement, but makes two 
strong assumptions: that the government only investigates encroachment undertaken in 
the particular period rather than also investigating possible previous encroachment; and 
that, if caught, there are no consequences for future opportunities to encroach. The 
implications of relaxing these assumptions are then discussed, thereby permitting a 
discussion of alternative approaches to stopping encroachment completely: that is, to 
achieve full compliance. The law enforcement literature has tended to ignore full-
compliance as uninteresting or unlikely, a reasonable conclusion for illegal activities in 
which cumulative effects are not critical. Hence mechanisms for achieving full 
compliance have not been a focus. Yet achieving full compliance as the norm rather Robinson   Page  8 
than the exception is essential if the boundaries between common and private land are 
to be stabilized.  
2. A Multi-Period Model of Encroachment and Enforcement 
The model is constructed as a game between a large number of farmers who live 
adjacent to an area of common land of initial area  A , and the government, which is 
responsible for the land.  Each player has perfect information, is risk neutral, and 
unconstrained, so that the impact of costly enforcement can be isolated.
9  
2.1 Encroacher and government objective functions 
All farmers are assumed to be identical, and so a representative farmer is 
considered, who ￿competes￿ with the government over the de facto property rights to 
the land.
10  The farmer attempts to acquire the land for cultivation through costly 
boundary encroachment.  The government attempts to slow down or prevent altogether 
this encroachment through costly enforcement activities, using either flow or stock 
enforcement.  Hence the model can be thought of as similar to a model of extraction of 
a finite resource.  However, in this case, two players are competing for the same 
resource, and, critical for the model, each manages and values the land differently, else 
the government would not be concerned about the encroachment. Specifically, the 
farmer is concerned only with his private returns to the land and so prefers to convert 
the land for farming rather than leave it in its original state. The government takes into 
                                                 
9   The simplifying assumptions in the model do not change the key findings, but do introduce 
biases. For example, an assumption of risk neutrality will over-estimate the area encroached 
if farmers are indeed risk averse. 
10  Robinson (1997) found that farmers typically do adhere to certain norms when encroaching 
at the common land boundary, suggesting that they are exploiting what could be termed an 
implicit pseudo-property right. For example, a farmer will not take land to the left or the 
right of his own land that could be encroached by her neighbours. Similarly, she would 
typically not permit a farmer to encroach the common land adjacent to her own because this 
removes her option to encroach the common land in the future. Robinson   Page  9 
account social benefits such as ground water recharge, and may also be concerned 
about access and equity. The game ends when no more encroachment occurs.   
The model is set up as a dynamic Stackelberg game. At the start of each period, 
the government chooses the level of enforcement, that is, how much to spend on patrols 
and whether to build a permanent barrier. Knowing the government￿s decisions, the 
farmer chooses how much to encroach. From a game-theoretic perspective, the 
government acts as the Stackelberg leader, the farmer as the follower, and so the 
farmer￿s optimisation is considered first.  
The farmer, if not caught and evicted in the period of encroachment, gets de 
facto permanent rights to the land. The punishment is eviction from the most recently 
encroached land, loss of the crop and any associated input costs, and possibly some 
additional fine. That is, in this model the probability of detection and the punishment is 
a function only of current period encroachment.
11 Given this model specification, the 
farmer maximizes expected returns to encroaching period-by-period: 
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The first term on the right hand side is the net present expected revenues from 
encroaching a distance  t L  into the commons, given that there is a probability  t p  of 
being caught and evicted in the period of encroachment, but the land is kept in 
perpetuity if the farmer is not caught.
12  ( ) t L w  are the variable costs of encroaching 
                                                 
11  Two key characteristics of punishments in Karnataka are that they are rarely punitive, and 
tend to be a function only of recent encroachment (Robinson, 1997; Abbot and Mace, 1999). 
12  In common with the enforcement literature, in the model the ￿flow of returns can be 
aggregated into a lifetime ￿ income￿ that is realized if the crime is not detected in the 
period of encroachment (Leung, 1991, p. 252). Robinson   Page  10 
such as labor, which are incurred whether or not the farmer is caught. The second term 
represents a fine,  ( ) t L N , that is proportional to the distance encroached, is fixed 
exogenously, and incurred only if the farmer is caught.
13 The final term is the cost of 
penetrating any fixed barrier such as a wall or fence if one has been erected, in which 
case δ =1, else δ =0. For ease of exposition, and without loss of generality, let 
P R  be 
constant,  ( ) t L w = t wL , and  ( ) t L N = t NL .  
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the farmer￿s maximization are:
14  
( ) 0 ≤ ′ L V , L ≥0, L ( ) 0 = ′ L V  
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The forward-looking government maximizes net present returns to land: 
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The first term on the right hand side is the returns to the remaining area of 





15 The second term is the per-period cost 
of enforcement effort  t F . In the third term, a parameter θ  is introduced whereby if the 
government￿s objective is to maximize returns only to the remaining common land, 
                                                 
13  If the expected punishment does not increase with the severity of the illegal activity, in this 
case the distance encroached, there is no effective method of deterring encroachers from 
encroaching the maximum distance. Hence the fine is assumed to be proportional to the 
distance encroached. And without limits to the amount that someone can be punished, any 
desired pattern of deterrence ￿could be achieved at minimal cost by combining arbitrarily 
low monitoring with sufficiently steep penalties,￿ (Mookherjee and Png, 1994, p. 1049), as 
proscribed by Becker (1968). In less-developed countries, fines tend to be small or 
negligible, given in part the low levels of disposable income for most rural inhabitants, and 
so it is reasonable to assume that the fine is not a choice variable in this paper. 
14  The time subscript is suppressed for clarity. 
15  Critical to the model is the assumption that individual farmers and the government value the 
common land differently, due for example, to positive externalities such as ground water Robinson   Page  11 
θ =0, such that the returns to (illegally) encroached cultivated land 
E
t A are excluded 
from its objective function.  If the government￿s objective is to maximize total social 
returns to the land, returns to all land are included and so θ =1. The inclusion of the 
parameter θ  reflects Milliman￿s (1986) concern that some weight be attached to the 
benefits of illegal activity (see also Clarke et al., 1993, Robinson, 1997). In most of the 
law enforcement literature, it is assumed that the enforcer maximizes overall social 
welfare, implying a value for θ  of 1 (an assumption criticized in Stigler, 1970). The 
final term allows for the possibility that the government constructs a barrier at a cost B 
in period t, in which case δ =1, else δ =0. Consistent with the optimal enforcement 
literature, from the perspective of the government fines are simply transfers and so do 
not show up in the government￿s optimization. 
2.2 Equilibrium interaction 
The key issues addressed in solving for the equilibrium are: whether and if so 
how the government can prevent all encroachment without erecting a barrier; when if at 
all the government chooses to erect a barrier; and if not, what is the equilibrium path of 
encroachment and hence loss of common land. The Kuhn Tucker conditions for the 
farmer and the Euler equation for the government characterize the equilibrium.  
To solve the model, first, the government￿s optimization is re-written as an 
optimal control model that can explicitly account for both stock and flow enforcement. 
The state variable is the area of common land remaining, and the government￿s control 
variable is the amount of enforcement effort. Given that the barrier imposes a fixed cost 
to encroaching and does not affect the villager￿s marginal decision over how far to 
                                                                                                                                             
recharge that cannot be captured fully by the individual farmer. Else the tension between 
government￿s preference and farmer￿s is lost. Robinson   Page  12 
encroach, the government will only choose to erect the barrier if it stops encroachment 
entirely.
16 Hence the game ends if a barrier is erected.
17 
Second, because farmers optimise period-by-period, their actions can be 
incorporated via the equation of motion that links the area of common land remaining 
each period to the area encroached in the previous period. The optimal distance 
encroached by the farmer for a given level of enforcement effort is determined from the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions above. If a barrier has been built then no encroachment occurs 
for all future periods. If there is no barrier, the farmer￿s optimal encroachment for a 
given level of enforcement effort  t F ,  ( ) t t F L
* , is determined from the first order 
condition shown in Equation 2.  
Third, the probability function p is specified. The function captures the essential 
nature of enforcement ￿ the greater the distance encroached, or the greater the level of 
enforcement, the greater the probability that the encroacher will be caught and 
punished. That is,  t p = ( ) t t t L F p , .
18 Finally, the width of the encroachment is chosen to 
be the numeraire, the number of encroaching farmers is n, and it is assumed that the 
common land can be recovered after eviction. Hence the area of common land 
                                                 
16  In any one period the government uses either stock or flow enforcement but not both. In 
practice, if an enforcement agency does erect a barrier, it will also need some level of 
maintenance and patrol activities each subsequent year. However, from the model 
perspective, these on-going variable costs can be capitalized in the value of the fixed cost B 
of the barrier, and so there is no loss of generality in this model. In practice B could be 
endogenous to the model, but given that the model is comparing stock and flow 
enforcement, and that including an additional choice variable adds complexity to the model 
without adding additional insights, B is assumed to be exogenous and sufficient to stop all 
encroachment. 
17  Conceptually, a two-part fine could also be introduced, a combination of a fixed fine, and a 
fine that was proportionate to the distance encroached. In which case the fixed fine, if 
sufficiently large, would have the same effect as the barrier, but at much lower cost. 
However, such a scenario is improbable, as argued in footnote 13, and so not considered 
further in this paper. Robinson   Page  13 
remaining at the end of period t is  ( )
*
1 1 t t t
C L p n A − − − , and the total area of encroached 
land is A -( ( )
*
1 1 t t t
C L p n A − − − ). 
The optimal control model is written: 
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If it is optimal for the farmer to make some non-zero level of encroachment in 
some period t, the first order condition governing her actions is written: 
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t  [6] 
The Euler equation governing the government￿s actions, determined by taking 
the first derivative of the value function with respect to the government￿s choice of 
enforcement effort  t F , is written: 
                                                                                                                                             
18  The probability of being caught could also depend on the actions of the farmer￿s neighbours, 
or the proportion of the common land remaining that is encroached in the period. The 






















































































































                                                                                          




Although the Euler equation is a powerful tool to describe some of the key 
features of the equilibrium, analytical solutions can only be obtained if the functional 
forms are sufficiently simple such that the model￿s inherent non-linearities are 
removed. Moreover, given that the optimum may be a path with the gradual loss of 
common land, or the construction of a barrier such that there is no further 
encroachment, simply using the Euler equations does not give adequate insights into 
the model.  
However, a numerical simulation model with appropriate functional forms and 
calibration captures the path of endogenous variables that vary non-linearly over time 
as the area of common land decreases, and so can, for example, illustrate discrete 
changes in policy regime within a single run of the model. The simulation model 
employed in this paper accommodates explicitly the structural equation that represents 
the forward-looking enforcer, and changes over time of equilibrium enforcement 
policy.  
Before solving the model numerically to demonstrate different equilibrium 
paths of encroachment, a general discussion of the model provides some insights into 
the equilibrium path of encroachment.  Robinson   Page  15 
The equilibrium path of encroachment depends on assumptions over the relative 
value of common and private land, whether it is cost effective to construct a barrier, 
and whether the encroachment can be reversed. If 
C
t R =
C R  for all t ￿ that is, the returns 




t L W ∂ ∂ +  is zero, and the problem is simple. If 
C R < c R
P −  and θ =1, then the 
government allows all the common land to be encroached in period one since the social 
returns to cultivated land are greater than to common land. If θ =0, or 
C R > c R
P − , 
then, assuming that the length of the boundary remains constant, the government 
simply chooses between constructing a barrier straight away, or relying on a constant 
level of flow enforcement each period and accepting a constant area of encroachment 
each period until the common land disappears. The rate of loss depends on the relative 
cost of enforcement effort. Of more interest and often more realistic, and hence the 
scenario used in this paper, is when the marginal social returns to the common land 
increase as its area decreases (Panayotou and Parasuk, 1990; Robinson, 1997).  
 
Proposition 1: If there are no fixed costs to encroaching, then each period, so 
long as some common land remains, and for all but the most extreme calibrations of the 
model, in equilibrium there will be a positive amount of encroachment each period. 
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. So long as there are no fixed 
costs to encroaching, if the enforcer increases his spending on flow enforcement and 
hence, ceteris paribus, increases the probability of detection, the farmer can reduce the 
probability of being caught simply by reducing the distance she encroaches. Given that 
flow enforcement is costly, the value of the common land must be extremely high, or 
the cost of enforcement effort extremely low, for it to be optimal for the government to Robinson   Page  16 
prevent all encroachment. Hence, to stop all encroachment, the government must 
introduce some fixed cost to encroaching, such as a barrier, which itself is costly. 
Proposition 2: If the ratio of the length of boundary between the common and 
private land to the area of common land does not decrease, then a government which is 
not credit constrained will either construct a barrier in the first period or not at all. 
If the government values only the common land (θ =0) it will compare the net 
returns to the optimal path of gradual encroachment (determined by solving the 
dynamic optimisation model, assuming  t δ =0 for all t) with the net returns to erecting a 
barrier in period one and enclosing all the common land immediately. 
If the government values all land, (θ =1), then similarly it will compare the 
returns to the optimal path of gradual encroachment when θ =1 and  t δ =0 for all t with 
the net returns to enclosing the efficient area of common land in period one. This 








. That is, where the marginal 
returns to the area of common land are equal to the marginal returns to encroached 
land. Not surprisingly, given that a barrier does not affect the marginal decision on how 
far to encroach, this is the same condition as for costless enforcement. The government 
would then privatise the extra land, either explicitly, or by permitting rapid 
encroachment up to the barrier.  
3 A numerical example 
3.1 Calibration and functional forms 
The specific functional forms and calibration are chosen to illustrate some of the 
more interesting equilibrium paths that can arise from the model. For the probability Robinson   Page  17 
function, a simple exponential function, parsimoniously parameterised, is chosen, 
( ) ( ) [] 1 exp , 1 min − = t t t L F p γ , implying unlimited encroachment when the enforcement 
effort is zero.
19 Hence any gradual encroachment is not merely a function of farmers 
being constrained by the model￿s construction. The function relies on just one 
parameter, γ , set at 0.9 for the numerical simulation, which can be interpreted as a 
measure of the effectiveness of enforcement effort: The higher the value of γ  the more 
effective a specific level of enforcement. Higher values of γ  might be associated with 
an efficient judicial system, or with areas where encroachment is easier to see 
(Robinson, 1997).
20   
Private and social net returns to cultivated land, 
P R , are equal and fixed at 960 
rupees per acre of land per year, at the time of the fieldwork the approximate net 
returns to ragi ￿ finger millet ￿ the staple food crop in Karnataka (Nagaraj, 1995; 
Robinson, 1997).  The variable costs, c, typically land preparation and seed, are set at 
400 rupees per acre.
21 The marginal social returns to the common land are inversely 




t + ⋅ − = , where  1 k  and  2 k  are 
chosen to be 8.0 and 1800 respectively. The initial area of land,  A , is set at 90 acres. 
Hence the marginal social returns to the common land are initially lower than to 
cultivated land, implying that some conversion of land from common to farmed would 
                                                 
19  The problem of specifying a functional form and calibrating a probability function is 
recognized in the law enforcement literature (Nash, 1991).  For examples of efforts to 
specify and parameterise fully the probability function see, for example, Block et al. (1981), 
and McCormick and Tollison (1984). 
20  It is assumed that the value of γ itself is not a function of the area of common land 
remaining. 
21  Though in practice villagers can and do choose the extent to which they invest in land 
preparation and chemical inputs to reduce the upfront costs of investing on recently 
encroached land, thus reducing the risk of encroaching. Robinson   Page  18 
be optimal.  The extent to which an individual encroacher values the common land does 
not come into her optimisation and so need not be considered.
22  
As is common in dynamic optimisation models, the choice of terminal condition 
itself influences the model￿s outcome. For this model the two extreme terminal 
conditions are: one, that any common land remaining in period T has zero value for the 
government; and two, that any remaining common land can be kept for free by the 
government for all future periods. If comparing a myopic and forward-looking 
government, it is perhaps more interesting to use the terminal condition in which the 
common land has no value, biasing the results towards the more rapid loss of the 
common land, so as to emphasize that even though the land eventually has no value, the 
government still slows down considerably the rate of encroachment for many years. 
Choosing a terminal condition in which the land is retained costlessly by the 
government, implying for example that in the future enforcement is much more 
effective, would bias the results towards conservation of the common land in 
anticipation of the improved enforcement. Alternatively, an intermediate value of the 
common land can be chosen to mimic an infinite period game. However, by 
incorporating a sufficient number of periods, the sensitivity of the model to the terminal 
condition, particularly in the early periods, is reduced. 
3.2 Equilibrium paths 
If no fixed barrier is erected, when θ =1, three broad stages can be identified in 
the equilibrium transition of property rights from common to de facto private.  In the 
first stage, when the marginal social returns to the common land are initially well below 
                                                 
22  If villagers were to cooperate over managing the common land and chose between 
￿defecting￿ ￿that is encroaching, and cooperating ￿ that is protecting the common land and 
not encroaching, this private valuation would matter.  Robinson   Page  19 
the returns to cultivated land, the rate of encroachment is rapid and the level of 
enforcement is low.  In the second stage the rate of encroachment is lower, and 
enforcement levels higher. The increased enforcement effort begins even when the 
marginal social returns to the common land are below those to the cultivated land 
because the forward-looking government anticipates future encroachment and so 
restricts encroachment in the early periods even when the marginal returns to cultivated 
land are higher than to common land. However, as more land is encroached the 
marginal returns eventually increase above those to the cultivated land, implying excess 
encroachment relative to a zero-cost enforcement scenario. In the third stage no further 
encroachment occurs, because no common land remains to be encroached.
23  
Figure 1 shows such an equilibrium path of encroachment, enforcement effort, 
and marginal returns to the land when θ =1, for the particular model calibration. The 
figure also, for comparison, shows the equilibrium path for a myopic government and 
the equilibrium path if a barrier is constructed (the latter path equivalent to the path for 
costless enforcement).  If the government is myopic the common land is encroached 
much more rapidly than if the government were forward looking. In the first period the 
government, not anticipating future encroachments, permits the statically efficient level 
of encroachment (such that the marginal returns to common and private land are equal). 
Then in future periods, the rate of encroachment slows down as the marginal returns to 
the common land increase above those to the private land, though still more rapid than 
for the forward-looking government.  
                                                 
23  As discussed earlier in the paper, under extreme calibrations it is possible that an 
equilibrium could be achieved in which there is a finite area of common land remaining and 
zero encroachment. This would be most likely if the variable costs of encroaching were 
extremely high, the returns to encroaching extremely low relative to very high marginal 
returns to the common land, or the cost of enforcement very low. Robinson   Page  20 
If θ =0, land encroachment is more gradual and the path of land transfer from 
common to private relatively smooth.  This slower rate of encroachment comes at a 
cost. Enforcement costs each period are much higher and the total social returns to land 
are lower because land allocation is less efficient.   
To determine whether or not it is optimal for the forward-looking government to 
construct a barrier, the net returns using flow enforcement are compared with the 
returns assuming costless enforcement. If the difference is greater than the cost of the 
barrier, then building the barrier is efficient. 
Changing patterns of, and acceptance of, encroachment can be identified in 
southern India over the past century and appear to be reflected in state-level legislation.  
The rapid conversion of land from common to cultivated land was commonplace in 
southern India at the turn of the century, constrained only by the availability of labour 
for land preparation, and encouraged by the 1894 Indian Forest Act which implicitly 
recognizes that it is in the country￿s interest for people to farm more of the forest.  In 
effect, the government was acting as if the weight, θ , on returns to illegal 
encroachment were non-zero.  As common land became scarcer and correspondingly 
more valuable, actions that were once encouraged were deemed illegal.  Subsequent 
changes in the law suggest that farmers who had been perceived as pioneers were now 
seen as encroachers stealing the common land.  In Karnataka this second phase was 
reached during the 1970s when the Karnataka Land Reform Act of 1974 was passed.  
The state government did not punish those who had encroached earlier when it was 
considered acceptable, but announced that further encroachment would be punished 
with fines and eviction.  Though illegal, encroachment continued, but at a slower pace.   Robinson   Page  21 
More recently, evidence of the third phase can be found. In many villages in 
Karnataka, discrete areas of common land have disappeared completely (gradually 
absorbed into private land holdings despite often remaining common on official land 
records: Nadkarni and Pasha, 1991; Nagaraj, 1995; and Robinson, 1997).  In Kolar 
district, 500 of the 4479 original tanks ￿ small reservoirs constructed to retain run-off 
water above surface level ￿ have disappeared, due either to neglect or encroachment.  
In Kodagu district, only 346 of the original 755 sacred groves ￿ protected forests ￿ that 
existed in 1900 remain; most of this loss has been attributed to encroachment (Nagaraj 
1995). In one specific village in Karnataka visited by the author, all twelve acres of 
government revenue land ￿ typically scrub land ￿ had been encroached over the past 
four decades, the original five acres of gomal land ￿ grazing land ￿ had been reduced to 
half an acre to which there was no longer public access, much of the ninety or so acres 
of forestland had been assimilated into the private holdings of those with bordering 
land (Robinson, 1997).  
4. Alternative model scenarios 
4.1 Alternative enforcement strategies 
Although this paper has focused on just two ￿enforcement technologies￿, other 
approaches could be taken to slow down encroachment. For example, investigation of 
an individual￿s history of encroachment if they are caught can increase the deterrence 
effect of being caught to the point at which the individual chooses not to encroach after 
a number of years, even when the probability of detection is relatively low. However, 
certainly in much of India, even though no statute of limitations per se exists, frequent 
changes in land laws and the difficulty in proving where an original boundary was, or 
when encroachment occurred (the latter important for anticipated regularization of Robinson   Page  22 
land) suggest that although theoretically appealing, such an approach likely would not 
be practicable.  
From a modelling perspective, the encroacher￿s problem would be modelled as 
an optimal stopping problem (a spatial analogy can be found in Robinson et al, 2000). 
If individuals recognize that being caught for an illegal activity undertaken in the 
current period implies being punished for all previous illegal activities, then the 
expected cost of encroaching increases considerably more than the expected marginal 
benefits each time the villager encroaches. At some point it becomes optimal to 
encroach no further because the expected cost of being caught and losing all previous 
encroachment is higher than the expected benefits from further encroachment. The 
equivalent scenario in the law enforcement literature would be one in which an 
individual caught committing a crime would have all his past investigated for earlier 
illegal activities and punishment would be based on all previous detected criminal acts 
in addition to the present crime.
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A further punishment structure, explored in Robinson (1997), is to prevent 
farmers from encroaching again if they are caught. That is, a farmer would be out of the 
￿game￿ permanently if caught. Such an outcome could be achieved by continuously 
patrolling the boundary of those caught such that the probability of being caught in the 
future was one. Or, more practically, local villagers could be extra vigilant of those 
neighbours known to encroach. A forward-looking encroacher would now recognize 
consequences over and above losing the land encroached in that period; the cost of 
being caught would be the expected returns to all future encroachment attempts, not 
just to encroachment in that period. From a modelling perspective, the encroacher￿s Robinson   Page  23 
optimisation could no longer simply be incorporated period-by-period into the equation 
of motion. Rather, a stochastic model must be solved. The threat of being out of the 
game permanently if caught acts as a tax on a farmer￿s encroachment decision, and so 
each period she encroaches less than if she were not at risk of being excluded 
permanently from the game. 
4.2 Irreversibilities 
The optimal enforcement technology also depends on the extent to which the 
government can, in practice, reverse the effects of encroachment. In the base-case 
model, when a farmer is evicted the land is recovered back to its original state at zero 
cost. Yet in practice, the ability of the government to recover the common land depends 
on both physical irreversibilities ￿ such as when primary forest is cut down ￿ and 
institutional irreversibilities ￿ in India it is not uncommon for a court case to take over 
ten years within which period the land laws could have changed.  
From a modelling perspective, to isolate the impact of such irreversibilities, the 
farmer, rather than being evicted, is fined an amount equal to the net present value of 
the land encroached in that period. Hence, period-by-period, farmers are indifferent as 
to whether they are evicted or fined but allowed to keep the land.  Whether or not 
encroachment is irreversible is accommodated in the equation of motion. If 
encroachment is not reversible, the equation of motion is written 
*
1 t t t nL A A − = + . Not 
surprisingly, both the rate of loss of common land and the enforcement costs are higher 
when irreversibilities are present (see Figure 2). Ceteris paribus, the ability of the 
authorities to reverse the effects of encroachment has cumulative benefits over time.  
                                                                                                                                             
24  Such a rationale is behind the so-called ￿three strikes and you are out￿ legislation in 
California. Robinson   Page  24 
In reality, the equilibrium response of the authorities to encroachment will 
depend on the relative costs of different punishment regimes (for example, it tends to 
be cheaper to impose a fine than to evict a farmer), the benefits, and the feasibility of 
each punishment strategy.  If more than one punishment regime is possible, the choice 
of punishment should be endogenous to the model.
25 Further, whether or not 
encroachment is irreversible has implications for the type of enforcement strategy 
adopted by the government. If encroachment is irreversible, then there should be more 
emphasis on prevention rather than detection and eviction, and hence more likelihood 
that a permanent barrier is erected.  
4.3 Community involvement 
Encroachment is a highly complex phenomenon that, like most resources, is 
influenced by the interaction of formal and informal mechanisms and social norms that 
influence behavioural patterns (Berkes et al., 1989).  In the villages of rural southern 
India land is de jure covered by formal property rights regimes.  However, the extent to 
which the common land is managed and protected depends both on the efficacy of the 
official regime and the ability or will of the local community to take on the role of 
management of the commons in the absence of formal enforcement.  Village customs 
and norms are a critical factor in determining the rate of encroachment. For example, 
Nagaraj and Chandrakanth (1995, p.14) write that in Coorg, a region of Karnataka, 
norms of protecting and sustaining Devara kadu ￿have been practiced for years by the 
village community￿.  An expectation exists that people will neither encroach nor cut the 
trees and these expectations are maintained in part through annual rituals linked to 
religious norms.  Punishment for violating the village norms involves open confession, 
                                                 
25  Few papers have considered multiple punishment instruments.  One that has is Polinsky and 
Shavell (1994), which compares the use of fines and imprisonment to deter harmful Robinson   Page  25 
apology, and the payment of a fine. They further write that the village community in 
Coorg itself provides a ￿social fence￿ to the Devara Kadu. That is, the enforcement of 
the boundary between common and private land can be physical or social. Yet even 
these lands are being encroached, suggesting that social norms are eroding. 
The extent to which villagers are willing to protect an area of common land 
from encroachment will be influenced by their own access to the commons, use of the 
commons, and their own ability to encroach. Encroachment typically worsens income 
distribution within a village, suggesting that many farmers ￿ those who rely on the 
commons and are themselves unable to encroach ￿ should have a strong incentive to 
prevent encroachment even without the help of the authorities. Such a pattern, 
concerning access to and theft from canals in northern India, was found by Ray and 
Williams. Inevitably, income inequalities and political influences often go hand in 
hand, with the richer and more influential farmers more likely to get away with 
encroaching. Hence even if villagers get positive utility from the commons and so 
might be expected to group together to protect the commons themselves they may not 
feel empowered to use informal channels to prevent more influential farmers from 
encroaching. 
5. Concluding comments 
Formal enforcement typically involved a combination of preventative measures, 
such as patrols to deter and detect encroachment, and fines and sometimes eviction for 
those caught. Informal enforcement included shunning, dumping mud on the 
encroached land, or simply taking back the land once the illegal encroachment had been 
proven by the villagers (Robinson, 1997). The fear of being ostracized or made to 
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apologize in public could be enough to deter some people from encroaching (Robinson, 
1997). The threat of a prison sentence might be needed to deter others.  Yet despite the 
multitude of enforcement regimes encountered by the author, the fundamentals remain 
the same. From an enforcement perspective, protecting common lands is costly, and so 
may not be complete. From the encroacher￿ perspective, individuals weigh up the 
relative expected costs and benefits, whether financial or emotional, when determining 
whether and how much to encroach.  The underlying assumption behind this paper, 
based on empirical evidence, is that encroachment is an opportunistic action.  An 
individual gets an economic benefit from encroaching, and is deterred by the possibility 
of social or financial penalties.   
The dynamic framework developed in this paper demonstrates that the 
definition and realization of property rights depends on both current and future 
enforceability of the rights, and that when enforcement is costly, the state￿s de facto, 
and eventually de jure, property rights can erode over time.  Whenever boundaries are 
costly to enforce, a paradigm of absolute and static property rights may no longer hold: 
a gradual transition in de facto property rights from common to private may be a 
natural equilibrium resulting from the interaction between costly enforcement and 
opportunistic encroachment.   
As Jodha (1990) writes, in rural India, ￿privatisation is carried out either (i) 
through the formal distribution of common lands to landless and other groups under 
different welfare or development schemes, or (ii) through the legalization of illegal 
grabbing of CPR lands by people￿. When enforcement is costly, and an area of common 
land suffers from boundary encroachment, the government could be tempted simply to 
privatise the land straight away. In this way, they would prevent the snatching of land Robinson   Page  27 
that rewards those with land adjacent to the commons with yet more land. But official 
privatisation is costly for policy makers, whereas people who encroach bear the burden 
themselves of defining and protecting their land.    
Faced with continuing encroachment and insufficient budgets, solutions to 
protect common lands are not simple. Most likely the solution is not simply to dig 
deeper ditches, or increase the patrol frequency, the cost of which is often beyond the 
reach of local departments in LDCs. Rather, the government might work to strengthen 
local institutions, encourage more rapid detection to reduce eviction and land recovery 
costs, improve the definition and documentation of boundaries thereby lowering the 
costs of proving where boundaries are, and strengthen legal institutions. However, none 
of these solutions are simple, and many are costly and will take time to implement. 
Sequential decision-making leads to the possibility of dynamically inconsistent 
policy.  Although the law enforcement literature tends to ignore this possibility, state 
government actions in response to encroachment in Karnataka do suggest that the 
government has not always committed credibly to its enforcement policies.
26 Examples 
of dynamically inconsistent policy include frequently changing government policy and 
the willingness of the state government to permit farmers caught encroaching to remain 
on the land despite stated policy.  
Encroachment differs from most other illegal activities in that it tends to be 
highly visible, and hence relatively easy to detect.  Razzaz (1994) writes of illegal land 
markets that ￿the openness of the process brings into question the nature and the limits 
of law enforcement and efficacy of various forms of government intervention.￿  Policy 
makers often give mixed signals to those who have encroached or who intend to Robinson   Page  28 
encroach.  Although it is de jure illegal, those who are caught encroaching may not be 
punished but rather rewarded.  This may be explicit, the justification being that 
encroachers who improve the land should be rewarded for their entrepreneurialism, or 
implicit, when the tacit acceptance of encroachment is a cheap ￿ though invariably 
inequitable and ad hoc ￿ method of privatisation.   
Cumulative effects of non-compliance can be found in many different areas. In 
Thailand, boundary encroachment of forests has been a pervasive problem compounded 
by the fact that the illegal felling of trees is often irreversible (Panayotou and Parasuk, 
1990; MIDAS, 1991).  Pollution by factories adjacent to lakes can lead to a gradual 
accumulation of toxins in a finite body of water, even with optimal enforcement of 
enforcement of environmental legislation, let alone lax enforcement.  The illegal 
excessive sinking of wells for irrigation results in a gradual decline in the water table, 
which in time can result in irreversible land subsidence or saltwater incursion.  
Modelling the equilibrium management of such non-renewable resources when 
enforcement is costly necessarily requires a multi-period dynamic framework.  Only by 
shifting the focus away from a static steady-state equilibrium can the cumulative effects 
from incomplete enforcement be studied. 
Finally, location often matters: farmers who encroach at the boundaries are in 
effect exercising what can be termed a quasi-property right to encroach by virtue of 
owning a boundary with the common land.  The farmers exercise their right through 
excluding others from the common land adjacent to their own land and converting that 
land to cultivated land.  Likewise, only those farmers whose land is directly above an 
                                                                                                                                             
26  Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Kleit (1990, 1992) and Boadway et al. (1994), have 
addressed the problem of dynamically inconsistent regulation. Robinson   Page  29 
aquifer can extract the water by sinking a well.  They too have a quasi-property right to 
exploit, perhaps illegally, the aquifer.   Robinson   Page  30 
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Figure 1a. Area of common land remaining, period by period, when the 
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Figure 2. Impact of imposing a fine versus eviction on remaining area of common 
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